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Introduction
In the process of nation-state formation, many governments have engaged in homogenization
policies in order to establish political, social, and cultural hegemony. The Turkish state’s intensive
efforts to Turkify and Islamize Anatolia represent a prime example of this phenomenon. Using
census data to estimate casualties, I argue that the events of 1937-38, in the province that was then
called Dersim, in Eastern Turkey, should be classified as a genocide. Although state documents
of that period remain inaccessible, we know that military operations continued for more than a
period of two years, employing a large number of army troops.1 They used militaristic technology
including poisonous gas and heavy bombardments,2 and they destroyed the living conditions of
Alevi Kurds of Dersim through the burning of forests, fields, and villages.3 Children were forcibly
removed from their natal families.4 While the numbers of those killed still remain lost in history,
I examine archival records, memoirs, and first-hand accounts to arrive at estimated figures. These
make it clear that the actions of the Turkish military led to mass killings and had a devastating
impact on survivors, both mentally and physically.
Dersim: The Center of Kurdish Alevis
As a strategic and unique highland characterized by deep valleys, forests, and rivers, Dersim
served as a true refuge for Kurdish Alevis.5 Since the period of the Ottoman Empire to the present,
Dersim has “stood markedly at odds with the politico-cultural landscape of 1930s Turkey,”6 for
its non-Turkish ethnic character and, more importantly, for the predominance of the “heretic
religion” of the Alevis, who represented for the Turkish state a population that “needed to be
corrected and their savagery to be dispel[led].”7 As such, this article discusses the Dersim genocide
as part of the Turkish nation state’s homogenization policies and, particularly those that took
place inside its borders soon after its foundation between 1920-1923. The policies implemented
since 1930—especially those that followed the Iskan Kanunu/Resettlement Law of 1934 (hereafter
Resettlement Law)8—laid the foundations for the systematic, continual, and violent Turkification
and Islamization of Anatolia. Dersim was targeted soon after by the Kemalist cadres because of its
inhabitants’ religion and Kurdish ethnic background.
1

Kaynak Yayınları, Genelkurmay Belgelerinde Kürt İsyanları II (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2011), 109-132; Bilal N. Şimşir,
İngiliz Belgeleriyle Türkiye’de Kürt Sorunu (1924-1938): Şeyh Sait, Ağrı, ve Dersim Ayaklanmaları (Ankara: Türk Tarih
Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), 301; Kendal, “Kurdistan in Turkey,” in People Without A Country, The Kurds and Kurdistan, ed.
Gerard Chaliand (London: Zed, 1980), 67.

2

Dersim Gazetesi, “Zehirli Gazlar Nazi Almanyası’ndan Alınmış!,” Dersim Gazetesi, May 15, 2019, accessed July 8, 2020,
http://dersimgazetesi.net/zehirli-gazlar-almanyadan-bombardiman-ucaklari-amerikadan-alinmis/; “Dersim Katliamı
Ile Ilgili Yeni Belgeler Ortaya Çıktı: Dersim’de Nazi Gazları,” Pirha, May 11, 2019, accessed July 7, 2020, https://www.
pirha.net/dersim-katliami-ile-ilgili-yeni-belgeler-ortaya-cikti-dersimde-nazi-gazlari-171973.html/11/05/2019/; Nuri
Dersimi, Kürdistan Tarihinde Dersim (Diyarbakır: Dilan, 1991), 301; Kendal, Kurdistan, 67.

3

Kaynak, Genelkurmay Belgeleri II, 202; Faik Bulut, Dersim Raporları (Istanbul: Evrensel Basım Yayım, 2009), 341; Mahmut
Akyürekli, Dersim Kürt Tedibi 1937-1938 (Istanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2012), 159.

4

Nezahat Gündoğan and Kazım Gündoğan, Dersim’in Kayıp Kızları (Istanbul: İletişim, 2016), 17; Özgür Fındık, Kara
Vagon, Dersim-Kırım ve Sürgün (Istanbul: Fam, 2012), 215; Hüsnü Gürbey and Mahsuni Gül, “Dersim’de Nazi Gazı,”
Rojnameya Newroz, May 16, 2019, accessed April 4, 2020, http://rojnameyanewroz2.com/dersimde-nazi-gazi-h-gurbeym-gul-14583.html.

5

The region’s altitude averages between 1,000 and 1,500 meters in inhabited areas and exceeds 3,000 meters in the high
and rocky mountains.

6

Hans-Lukas Kieser, “Dersim Massacre, 1937-1938,” Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence, July 27, 2011, accessed April 5,
2019, https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/dersim-massacre-1937-1938.

7

Barış Ünlü, “Kürdistan/Türkiye ve Cezayir/Fransa: Sömürge Yöntemleri, Şiddet ve Entellektüeller,” in Türkiye’de Siyasal
Şiddetin Boyutları, ed. Güney Çeğin and İbrahim Şirin (Istanbul: İletişim, 2014), 425.

8

Iskân Kanunu (Turkish Resettlement Law) of 1934 (Law No. 2510, June 21, 1934), (Rep. of Turkey), accessed July 7, 2020,
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/2733.pdf.
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Hamit Bozarslan, however, made it clear that the official ideology of Turkey was not Kemalism
but rather Turkish Islamic Synthesis (TIS), an ideology whose roots can be traced back to the ideas
expressed by Ziya Gökalp between 1910 and 1920. The TIS in its current form was developed
by a club of right-wing intellectuals (Aydinlar Ocağı/Home of Intellectuals) in the 1970s and was
subsequently adopted by the generals of the 1980s coup.9 Henry Barkey observed that the primary
objective of state policy at that time was the assimilation of the Kurds. This state assimilation
policy contained both repressive and inclusionary dimensions, with the latter applicable only to
those who accepted the dominant Turkish identity.10 In 1934, the state adopted the Resettlement
Law to establish a juridical basis for resettling the country’s population according to cultural
and linguistic groupings. As such, the state referred to the regions around Dersim as East and
South East Anatolia, refusing to identify it as Kurdistan. Furthermore, its residents were referred
to euphemistically as the population whose mother tongue was not Turkish and who should
therefore be forced to migrate for purposes of assimilation,11 in accordance with the Islahat/reforms.
To promote demographic change in Anatolia and Kurdistan in particular, the non-Turkish areas
were to be repopulated through the state-sponsored resettlement of Turkish immigrants in order
to trigger the subsequent assimilation of the non-Turkish population. Accordingly, the country was
divided on June 14, 1934 into three zones:
Zone 1: The areas desired to increase the density of the culturally Turkish population.

Zone 2: The areas deposited for the transference and resettlement of the populations
that desired to be assimilated into Turkish culture.
Zone 3: The areas that had been decided to be evacuated for the health, economic, cultural,
political, military and discipline reasons and where resettlement was prohibited.12

Dersim was in the third zone, which meant it was to be evacuated and closed to inhabitants. For that
reason, in 1936, the Fourth Inspectorate was established and lieutenant general Abdullah Alpdoğan
“was granted the highest judicial and administrative powers to facilitate the implementation of
the reform program”13 in Dersim. Through this program, non-Turks and non-Muslims would
be removed from where they collectively resided and relocated to zones in which they could be
assimilated.
The Resettlement Law was used in conjunction with Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu (the Law of the
Maintenance of Order),14 another important legal tool of that period. To promote Turkification,
state policies sought to rearrange the non-Turkish population such that it would not exceed ten
percent of the Turkish population in any one location. Thus, from 1930s on, the state increased
these operations, which reached their peak in Dersim in 1938.15
Hamit Bozarslan, “Political Crisis and the Kurdish Issue in Turkey,” in The Kurdish Nationals Movement in the 1990s, Its
Impact on Turkey and the Middle East, ed. Robert Olson (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky,1996), 137.
10
Henri Barkey, “Under the Gun: Turkish Foreign Policy and the Kurdish Question,” in The Kurdish Nationalist Movement
in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East, ed. Robert Olson (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky,
1996), 66.
11
Taha Baran, 1937-1938 Yılları Arasında Basında Dersim (Istanbul: İletişim, 2014), 26.
12
Iskân Kanunu, Art. 2 (translation by the author).
13
Zeynep Türkyılmaz, “Maternal Colonialism and Turkish Woman’s Burden in Dersim: Educating the ‘Mountain
Flowers’ of Dersim,” Journal of Women’s History 28, no. 3 (2016), 165, accessed July 7, 2020, doi: https://doi.org/10.1353/
jowh.2016.0029.
14
Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu (Law of the Maintenance of Order) of 1925 (Law No. 578, March 4, 1925), (Rep. of Turkey), accessed
July 7, 2020, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc003/kanuntbmmc003/
kanuntbmmc00300578.pdf. This law was planned to be valid for two years first, then on March 2, 1927 was extended
for two more years, to March 4, 1929. The law conferred extraordinary powers of authority upon the state rulers,
including jurisdiction over the death penalty and the pardoning of those convicted. These powers were harshly employed against the Kurdish opposition, including what took place in Dersim (Tunceli) in 1937/8. See Erik J. Zürcher,
Turkey: A Modern History (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2017), 177.
15
Serhat Aslan, “Kürdistan’da Doğa / Ekoloji Katliamı,” Toplum ve Kuram: Lêkolîn û Xebatên Kurdî Dergisi 9, (2014), 65,
accessed July 7, 2020, https://www.mezopotamyaekoloji.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Kurdistanda_Doga_Ekoloji_
Katliami.pdf
9
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The Genocide in Dersim16
Shortly after Raphael Lemkin coined the term genocide in 1943,17 Turkey was among the countries
that ratified the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereafter
referred to as “Genocide Convention”) on July 31, 1950 as a member state of the United Nations.18
Nevertheless, Turkey has never acknowledged or accepted responsibility for the Turkish state’s
part in such mass crimes, including those taking place before the convention’s ratification. On
the contrary, Turkey has systematically denied the crimes and continues to do so. In addition to
systematically blaming and dehumanizing the victims, the state has mobilized discourses that
portray the state itself as the victim in these scenarios.
Despite the existence of strong evidence to support the classification of the militaristic operations
in Dersim as genocidal acts, according to the definition set forth in the Genocide Convention,
Turkey has denied and minimized these allegations and sought to portray the events of 1938 as
a necessary act to civilize the region.19 In addition, given the contemporary political climate, few
dare to discuss these incidents. As such, neither researchers nor politicians have examined or fully
acknowledged the events that took place in Dersim in 1938 as a genocide until recently.20 Among
these few, Martin van Bruinessen, a Dutch anthropologist who focuses on Kurdish issues, argues
that “the brutal Dersim campaign was but the culmination of a series of measures taken in order to
forcibly assimilate the Kurds.”21 He thus offers the term of ethnocide to characterize the operations.
Although Bruinessen rightly shows that the main aim of the state was assimilation rather than
extermination,22 this does not contradict the classification of the act as a genocide itself, particularly
in relation to the case of Kurdish Alevis. Alevi Kurds, in general, and those in Dersim in particular,
have remained a great concern for the state’s homogenization policies. The Governor of Elaziz,23
Cemal Bey, had raised concerns in his report regarding the Kurdishness of Alevis,24 while Civil
Inspector Hamdi Bey had warned about the rise of Kurdish idealism and identity in Dersim and
concluded that civilizing Dersim was a fantasy, in his report referring to Dersim as a boil requiring

In recent years, local authors started to use tertele, a Kurdish term in both dialects (Kurmanci and Kirmancki) for
the events in Dersim between 1937-38. However, this term does not meet the meaning of genocide. Tertele refers
to depredation, the physical destruction of the property. Old Dersimian used “Qirkirin” (Kurmanci), “Qirkerdan”
(Kirmancki) for the events of 1937-38, meaning mass killings/genocide. They would say “Milet qirkirin, malê Dêsim
tertele kirin” (Killed people and depredated the property of Dersim). Therefore, the term of tertele is not appropriate
to use and also comes with risk, as in the future, it can be used to the refute the mass killing of people in order to deny
the genocide.
17
Raphaël Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress
(Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944).
18
United Nations (UN), General Assembly Resolution 260, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Genocide Convention), December 9, 1948 (UN Doc. A/Res/260(III)).
19
Gökçen Başaran İnce, “Zamanında Dersim Nasıl Haber Olmuştu?” December 15, 2011, Birikim, accessed July 30, 2020,
https://www.birikimdergisi.com/guncel/577/zamaninda-dersim-nasil-haber-olmustu; Erdoğan Aydın, Ölüm ve
Medeniyet Paradoksunda Dersim, Dersim Gazetesi, November 17, 2017, accessed July 31, 2020, http://dersimgazetesi.
net/olum-ve-medeniyet-paradoksunda-dersim/; Baran, Yılları Arasında Basında Dersim, 92.
20
İsmail Beşikçi, Tunceli Kanunu (1935) ve Dersim Jenosidi (Istanbul: Belge, 1990); Barış Ünlü, “‘Turkishness contract’ and
Turkish left,” Perspectives: Political analysis and commentary from Turkey, no. 3.13, eds. Ulrike Dufner, Özgür Gürbüz,
Semahat Sevim, Yonca Verdioglu (Istanbul: Henrich Böll Stiftung, December 2012), 23, accessed July 31, 2020, https://
www.boell.de/sites/default/files/perspectives_turkey_3_eng.pdf; Bilgin Ayata and Serra Hakyemez, “The AKP’s
engagement with Turkey’s past crimes: an analysis of PM Erdoğan’s ‘Dersim apology’,” Dialect Anthropology 37 (2013),
131-143, accessed July 31, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10624-013-9304-3.
21
Martin van Bruinessen, “Genocide in Kurdistan? The Suppression of the Dersim Rebellion in Turkey (1937-38) and
the Chemical War Against the Iraqi Kurds (1988),” in Conceptual and Historical Dimensions of Genocide, ed. George
J. Andreopoulos (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 149, Academia.edu, accessed June 6, 2019,
https://www.academia.edu/2521265/Genocide_in_Kurdistan_The_Suppression_of_the_Dersim_Rebellion_in_
Turkey_1937-38_and_the_Chemical_War_Against_the_Iraqi_Kurds_1988.
22
Ibid., 9.
23
Presently Elazığ.
24
Reşat Hallı, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Ayaklanmalar (1924–1938) (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1972), 375.
16
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excision.25 In accordance with those reports, The Şark Plan to promote the assimilation of the Kurds26
was formulated by İbrahim Tali Öngören, one of the top architects of the state’s homogenization
policies.27 The Commander of General of Staff Fevzi Çakmak summarize this plan for Dersim as
follows: “Dersim should primarily be accepted as a colony, Kurdishness should be melted into
Turkishness, and then should be subjected to particular Turkish jurisdiction.”28
Following a seven-year period of preparation for Dersim that began in the 1930s, the
implementation of the plan began in 1937. Therefore, the militaristic operations in Dersim during the
period of 1937-38 represented an attempt to exterminate the population. Although state documents
mainly emphasize the Kurdish character of Dersim, it was not targeted solely because of its ethnic
composition but also due to the city’s central significance for Kurdish Alevis.29 Therefore, the main
seyid30 families were among those specifically targeted for killing and exile. Seyid Riza, one of the
most respected religious and political leaders of Dersim, was one of them.
In addition, the main target of the state was the political structure of Dersim which was
based upon two main institutions: the Ocax system and the tribe system. The Ocax system is a
religious institution unique to Kurdish Alevi social life, functioning to address major societal issues
without the need for any governmental oversight. According to the second article of the Genocide
Convention, to classify an event as a genocide does not require a certain number or percentage
of a particular group be killed, but, rather, hinges on the calculated intention of the act. Thus,
by the definition provided in the second article, the actions of the Turkish state clearly meet the
criteria to be classified as genocidal not just because of the intention to kill a number of people but
because the intervention was intended to dismantle Kurdish Alevi social structures,31 to remove the
population from the region, and assimilate those remaining, as clearly stated by Celal Bayar, the
Prime Minister, in a speech to Parliament in 1938.32
Taking a closer look at Article 2 of the Genocide Convention, genocide is defined as:
[A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing
Ibid.
Baskin Oran, “Ulus Devlet ve Dersim,” in 1. Uluslararası Tunceli (Dersim) Sempozyumu Bildiriler, ed. Hıdır Özdemir, et
al. (Tunceli: Tunceli Universitesi, 2010), XXVI.
27
Jandarma Umum Komutanlığı Raporu (JUK Report) (Istanbul: Kaynak, [1932] 2010), 239. Jandarma Umum Komutanlığı
hereby (JUK) will be used as the abbreviation.
28
Original text as follows: “Dersim evvelâ Koloni gibi nazarı itibara alınmalı, Türk camiası içinde Kürtlük eritilmeli,
ondan sonra tedricen öz Türk hukukuna mazhar kılınmalıdır,” JUK Report, 242.
29
Recent efforts to argue that the 1937-38 operations in Dersim were not targeting Kurdish identity but only the Alevi
community are not accurate. Dersim was targeted because of its position at the intersection of two identities, both
equally non grata within a Turkish Islamic ideological state. In addition to the sources referenced in the article,
there are quite important witness statements and memoirs containing accounts from soldiers who took part in the
operations. One of them writes: “[W]e have started to move on the Kurds in Dersim on July 27, 1938,” see, Zeynep
Türkyılmaz, “Dersim Soykırımı ve ‘Kötülüğün Sıradanlığı,’” Agos, November 11, 2019, accessed March 8, 2020,
http://www.agos.com.tr/tr/yazi/23286/dersim-soykirimi-ve-kotulugun-siradanligi. In a documentary film on Dersim
1937-38, Özgür Fındık, “Fındık - 38 Dersim Sürgünleri,” aired on May 4, 2011, YouTube video, 01:06:39, uploaded
on December 6, 2018, Can TV, accessed March 8, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ao-_qvFXcVg, a Turkish
soldier who participated in the operations recalls and says “we came here and gathered, took the Kurds to a stream
and killed them,” Fındık, Kara Vagon, 00:21:07. The same soldier recollects that their commander stated that “there are
four traitors in the world. Do you know them? One is the rat, one is the wolf, one is the pig and the other is the Kurd,”
Fındık, Kara Vagon, 00:22:09-00:22:30. A villager in a western city of Turkey that hosted those exiled from Dersim adds
that “we were told that Kurds came from the caves, we went to see,” Fındık, Kara Vagon, 00:50:19. Despite previous
references, recently, state sources have joined scholarly efforts to downplay Dersim’s Kurdish character. See Fındık,
Kara Vagon, 01:06:39.
30
Members of a sacred lineage/caste who have the rights and duties to perform religious services. Dilşa Deniz, “Kurdish
Alevi Belief System, Rêya Heqî/Raa Heqi: Structure, Networking, Ritual, and Functions,” in Kurdish Alevis and the Case
of Dersim: Historical and Contemporary Insights, ed. Erdal Gezik & Ahmet Kerim Gültekin (Lexington, London, 2019),
53.
31
The political structure (ashirets) and the religion structure (the seyids) were attacked first. Leaders were executed and the
societal survival mechanisms were ruined.
32
Suat Akgül, Yakın Tarihimizde Dersim İsyanları ve Gerçekler (Istanbul: Boğaziçi, 1992), 155.
25
26
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serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring
children of the group to another group.33

With the exception of part (d) – which cannot be assessed due to lack of information – all other
acts referenced within the article took place. Thus, in contrast to van Bruinessan’s argument calling
the event ‘ethnocide’ due to the assimilation policy of the State targeting the Kurds, it is evident
that not just Kurdish identity but most importantly Kurdish Alevi identity and the population
were targeted. Nearly all state reports about Dersim from that time expressed the opinion that the
seyids represented a danger and exerted a negative effect on the society.34 Seyids are the members
of an important institution of Kurdish Alevism. Accordingly, operations in Dersim were direct
attacks on the survival of the Kurdish Alevi community and also sought to eradicate its political
and societal structures, which are uniquely shaped by a combination of tribal and religious
affiliation. Therefore, given that Dersim operations deliberately targeted the Kurdish Alevi society,
which ultimately resulted in the mass killing of between a minimum of twenty percent and fifty
percent of the Alevi Kurd population in Dersim, this article argues that the whole process should
be considered a genocidal act.
According to theories of genocide, the denial stage is ranked as the last or tenth stage of most
genocides.35 In Dersim, this stage actually preceded the genocide when the city of Tunceli was
formed officially by law 2884 in parliament in 1935 (hereafter Dersim/Tunçeli Law)36 one year
before the city was physically established, as show below in Figure 1.37 Derived from the Turkish
words for iron (tunç) and hand (el), respectively, the city’s name carried with its connotations of
the iron hand or fist (of the Turks). This is strong evidence suggesting the genocide was already
being carefully planned prior to 1937-38 and Tunceli was the name given to the region where the
planned genocide would take place. Thus, Tunceli and Dersim have always been two dissenting
terms and political markers: while Dersim represents the name of the past, evoking Kurdishness,
religious belief, and autonomy, Tunceli continues to be reminiscent of the state’s intent to Turkify
and Islamize, and the culmination of these efforts in the 1938 Dersim genocide.

Figure 1. Map of Tunceli/Dersim. Part of the Dersim region was designated as Tunceli city for the military
operation of 1937-38.
33

UN, Genocide Convention, Art. 2.

34

Ömer Kemal Ağar, Tunceli-Dersim Coğrafyası (Istanbul: Türkiye Basımevi, 1940), 32; Akgül, Yakın Tarihimizde Dersim
İsyanları, 162.

35

Stages of genocide: 1. Classification; 2. Symbolization; 3. Discrimination; 4. Dehumanization; 5. Organization; 6.
Polarization; 7. Preparation; 8. Persecution; 9. Extermination; 10. Denial. See Gregory Stanton, “The Ten Stages of
Genocide,” Genocide Watch, accessed July 6, 2020, https://www.genocidewatch.com/ten-stages-of-genocide.

36

Tunçeli Vilâyetinin Idaresi Hakkında Kanun (Law on the Administration of the City of Tunçeli) of 1935, (Law No.2884),
January 2, 1936, (Rep. of Turkey), Resmi Gazete, accessed July 7, 2020, https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/3195.pdf.

37

Derived from the Turkish words for iron (tunç) and hand (el), respectively, the city’s name carried with its connotations
of the iron hand or fist (of the Turks). This is strong evidence suggesting the genocide was already being carefully
planned prior to 1937-38 and Tunceli was the name given to the region where the planned genocide would take place.
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Assessing the Harm Inflicted
Not only did the state plan the genocide, but they also made explicit efforts to suppress knowledge
of the death toll and prevent its inclusion in official documents or publications. Considering the
Law on the Maintenance of Order (1925) through which the state controlled any actions that might
upset the application of their plan before and after Dersim 1937-38, including the media. The British
ambassador at the time, Percy Loraine, noted “the Turkish press, … has preserved a complete
silence”38 with exception of “the Son Telegraf, which published on the 14th May an article hinting at
trouble in the eastern vilayets. The newspaper was promptly suspended and did not reappear until
several days later.”39 The only voice raised in that period was Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, a conservative
religious poet, who was in conflict with the Kemalist cadres. While Kısakürek refused to recognize
the Kurdish and Alevi identity of Dersimians, and, like the Kemalist/nationalists faction, referred to
the residents as “Muslim,” he claimed that the events in Dersim in 1938, “had no similar example
in history and at least 50,000 Muslims were killed.”40 Years later on February 19, 1942, the Prime
Minister, Ibrahim Refik Saydam, condemned the mass killings due to the use of poisonous gas in a
telegram to the Chief of General Staff Fevzi Çakmak. “The gas that [has been] used against its own
people has caused mass killings of civilians. As a doctor and a human, I must express that I am very
ashamed of it.”41 This telegram clearly shows that a high number of people were killed, although
no information is available to indicate exactly how many, as the state kept the records strictly
private. As such, there are only two distinct state records, both gleaned from indirect sources, as
the state never officially accepted or rejected responsibility for these mass killings.
While scholars and the public lack access to the official records, Serap Yeşiltuna, a Turkish
nationalist scholar and politician42 is the only one who has been granted access to these documents
and she estimated the casualty figure to be 13,801.43 In contrast, Necip Fazil Kısakürek suggests
this figure likely exceeded 50,000, a figure four times higher than the official records. Since the
state continues to prevent access to the archives, ambiguity continues to surround the number of
causalities and the number of wounded and forcibly relocated individuals. As such, researchers
have mainly used official census data preceding and following the period between 1937-38 to
infer the approximate number of causalities. However, in an effort to prevent researchers from
using this method, the state sources—most likely deliberately—from 1930 onward, have provided
dramatically contrasting estimates, sometimes even provided by the same persons, as discussed
below. Since the city itself was newly designed and not yet formally established, official census
data remain unavailable. Thus, many individuals counted as part of the population of the towns
that came to be considered Tunceli, were later added a second time to the population count to reach
the exact number of casualties.
Estimating how many were killed, injured, and exiled is not only challenging due to the state’s
efforts to suppress the records. Though census data could provide another means of calculating the
possible death toll, reports on the regional population vary significantly. The Ministry of Interior
indicated that somewhere between sixty-five and seventy thousand individuals were living in
Dersim in December 1935.44 In contrast, in the book published by Gendarmerie General Command
in 1932, this figure was given to be 150,000 by the same minister.45 This book was prepared by
Şimşir, Ingiliz Belgeleri, 303.
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Kazim Orbay, a high-ranking army officer who was later commanding the operations in Dersim46
and only a hundred copies were distributed to particular state officials who would later play a key
role in military operations in Dersim. This figure should therefore be considered the most accurate
source. The same number was also cited by Naşit Uluğ, a Turkish journalist (and intelligence
agent),47 one of only a few outsiders who had the opportunity to travel to Kurdistan during that
period.
Nevertheless, Martin van Bruinnesen has relied on estimates that place the population between
sixty-five and seventy thousand, a calculation justified by his claim that the historical district
of Dersim included parts of much larger neighboring cities such as Sivas, Erzincan, and Elazığ
provinces. Therefore, contemporary authors cite the “much higher population figure of 150,000,
apparently referring to larger Dersim.”48 Baki Öz, a pro-Turkish writer, also argues that Dersim
should not be understood only as the nucleus land around Tunceli, but Dersim’s tribes dispersion
area should also be included.49 As such, van Bruinnesen suggests that casualty estimates exceeding
forty thousand are greatly exaggerated.
Although both authors are correct in their attempts to account for all those residing within
the large geographical area historically referred to as Dersim, the given population figures do not
actually contain all the areas they refer to. On the contrary, these figures are based on the actual
population of the eight districts,50 which later included Tunceli city. Therefore, van Bruinessan’s
theory is shown to be inaccurate. The population estimate of 150,000 is actually derived from the
districts falling within the region of Tunceli, an area outlined for military operations, which Şükrü
Kaya, the Ministry of Interior, clearly describes as “the 150,000 population of districts that contains
Dersim.”51 This is clear evidence that state sources referenced two very different figures when
addressing different audiences. Although state officials were provided with the 150,000 figure, the
publicly shared estimates remained at 65-70,000, a figure that likely accounts for only half of the
actual population, leading to the intended confusion among scholars. This also suggests that the
number of people to be killed had been planned and calculated prior to the event.
Nuri Dersimi, a Kurdish politician from that period, indicates that the Turkish state surveyed
Dersim’s population in 1927 and estimated the population to number approximately 270,000,
excluding residents of the city of Pülümür. He also criticized Erzincan’s Governor, Ali Kemali, for
exaggerating the size of the Turkish population in Erzincan while underrepresenting the Kurdish
one.52 Ömer Kemal Ağar, an important state official of the region in that period, cited the population
of Dersim (excluding Pülümür) as 93,117 in 1935 and 105,911 in 1936, a figure that must also be
recognized as a misrepresentation due to the large segment of the population that sought to remain
unregistered to avoid compulsory military service and taxation.53 To support Dersimi’s claim, Uluğ
offers the following example: “Kureyşan’s population reaches 2000. If you ask them, this number
does not exceed 700. You cannot learn the exact population of any of these tribes; they are afraid
that the tax would be raised, thus we cannot hide from the government.”54 A similar opinion has
been expressed by Munzur Çem, a contemporary Dersimian writer, who argues that “Kurds are
the people who tend to keep their relation with the state to a minimum—as it is seen as a foreign
power- and to avoid paying tax or performing military service.”55
Ibrahim Tali described Dersim as “very crowded and armed. To disarm Dersim is not a matter
of days, weeks or months. It is a two-year job.”56 Such a claim clearly demonstrates the length of
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time that was necessary for the state to prepare for the operations of 1938 and also accounts for
the exact two-year length of time for the operations in Dersim. Both Ağar and Uluğ rely upon
the state’s population estimates, that exceeded one hundred thousand. The same approach has
been adopted by contemporary ultra-nationalist Turkish sources, who estimate the population of
Dersim in 1935 to be 107,723,57 to quell recent discussions surrounding the suppressing of census
data to mask casualty numbers in that period. Thus, to derive casualty estimates using the few
available sources, one must consider: a state record dated November 11, 1939 indicating that 13,801
persons had been killed and Kısakürek’s figure of 50,000.58 Raffi Bedrosyan, an Armenian writer,
noted death tolls as “rang[ing] from 13,000 according to Turkish sources—40,000 to U.S. and 80,000
to Kurdish sources.”59 Despite the lack of the reference, this is the first time the US mentioned a
figure.
These are the only figures available. The nationalist scholar Yeşiltuna argues that even the
figure of 13,801 is high and does not fit the order of the documentation of 155 folders, a series
of reports documenting the years between 1935 and 1938, beginning from August 13, 1935 and
ending on September 12, 1939. She argues that the casualty figures should be accepted as 2,0003,000 at most,60 suggesting that the currently accepted figure is nearly three to four times higher
than the actual figures and argues for the replacement of the documents.61 However, she fails to
explain why and how the documents on Dersim 1937-38 in the folder were replaced in the General
Chief Staff’s archive, the most secure building in Turkey. If there was a switch, as she suggests,
then it must have taken place with the complicity of state officials. In that case, it is the state that
changed the figures, meaning they either reduced or increased the numbers. If, on the one hand,
the figure was reduced, that means the actual number is higher by more than two or three times.
On the other, if the state increased the numbers, it implies that they did not correctly document the
actual number of casualties in 1938 and thus gradually increased this figure as they became aware
of more accurate estimates. In both cases, it is clear that the state, alone, has the power to alter the
figures and any change taking place has the necessity to be in congruence with the interests of the
state. The second of the two scenarios is the more probable. As discussed below, the death reports
were completed mostly after the 1940s, between five and ten years after the events of 1938, and thus
it is important to compare these numbers with the yearly census to determine the most accurate
casualty figures.
Year
1940
1945
1950
1955

Population
94,639
90,446
105,759
121,743 (Fırat Development Agency 2013).62

As evident above, the rate of population growth between 1940 and 1945 reveals a negative
trend with the overall population decreasing by 4,193. Between 1945 and 1950, the population
increased by 15,313 (seventeen percent)—a figure which represents the most dramatic increase—
while during the period between 1950 and 1955 an increase of 15,984 (fifteen percent took place).
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Şükrü Aslan, who interestingly refers to the 1935 census as the last census before the great exile,63 a
term by which he avoids any reference to the violence and mass killings that took place64 explains
this increase in the 1950 census as partially emanating from the return of those exiled.65 If we take
the average of the two to be 16% growth, that means the population in 1945 (94,639 plus 15,144
(%16)) should be 109,781, revealing the unexpected absence of 19,335 individuals. If we combine
the estimate of 13,810 causalities with the figure of 19,335, the total number of individuals missing
from Dersim during this period is roughly 33,145. Moreover, if we include the missing population
between 1935 and 1940 using the same methods of calculation as employed above, 107,723 minus
94,639 is 13,084. Thus, combining these figures, (33,145 plus 13,084, which represents the normal
growth of the population) suggests that 46,229 people were killed at minimum.
In another calculation, if one considers the population of 150,000 in contrast with the 1945
figure, it appears that 59,554 individuals are missing (150,000 – 90,446; 59,554 – 11,818- the
forcibly moved population - equals 47,736). If we were to add at least 15,000 to account for normal
population growth, the figure of the missing population would reach 62,736. Thus, it is clear that
according to two different calculations based on the state sources regarding the census in 1937-38
in Dersim, minimum between 46,000-63,000 people were killed and over one and a half thousand
people, mostly children, are missing.
Even the figures calculated above, since they are based on the registered population, do not
account for all children. Young children in that period were not usually registered in the census
and therefore were not included in figures employed in both calculations. As Dersimians mostly
sought to avoid encounters with the state, the registration of young children in particular was
irregular and infrequent. Since the penetration of the state was not total, the state mainly put
pressure on muhtars66 to register the population. Muhtars registered people on an irregular basis to
balance the competing demands of the state and the community. Ağar and Uluğ both argue that
“a large number of the population is not registered,”67 a fact supported by the document below.
The document belongs to the family of Bertal Axa, as shown in Figure 2, who was a merchant. The
document was provided at the behest of his grandson, upon the condition that it be used only for
cadastral and inheritance purposes. Subsequently, such documents were rarely furnished given
their potential to be used as evidence of crimes.68

I have italicized the term the great exile for emphasis. In the original, Şükrü Aslan refers to “Büyük sürgün” (the great
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Figure 2. Document belonging to family of Bertal Axa. See Radikal, 29/08/2014.69
Based on the above document, Ağci (1912), Zöhre (1913), and Azime (1914)70 were registered
on the same date of 1941, while the first four people have not been registered at all, indicating
that approximately seven people out of twelve may not have been registered before 1936,71 which
would amount to nearly half the population. This, in turn, supports the previous estimates of the
unregistered population and the state’s estimate that 150,000 individuals resided in Dersim before
the genocide. The fact that so many people were registered after 1941, three years after the genocide,
explains why it was not possible to count the causalities from bombings, poisonous gas, burning of
forests, stabbing, and the use of machine guns in indiscriminate mass killing at that time. It is clear
from the document that, particularly in 1938, no exact count of the causalities had been attempted.
The state then began its efforts to determine the approximate death toll, as potential victims would
have been registered a few years later. According to the document above, only three out of twelve
people were registered in the 1935 census. Therefore, neither the population figures below a 100
thousand are correct, nor the given casualty figure of 13,810. In another report, the Third Army
Inspectorate indicated that “in two searches and a total of seventeen days, 7,954 persons have been
taken out of the searched region, dead or alive.”72 If we compare these seventeen days with the
larger two-year timeframe, it is not hard to imagine that the true number of casualties must have
69
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been significantly higher. Because of the massive number of causalities, the state, perhaps either
reluctant or unable to provide the exact number of causalities, has chosen to employ a definition
that relies upon the distinction of dead or alive.
Regarding the 11,818 people forcibly removed, which was a figure common to all reports,73
particularly that by Öngören, it is clear that the state had initially planned the removal of 2,000
people, then went on to add an additional 5,000,74 and subsequently, once again doubled this figure,
further evidence that mass extermination was the state’s ultimate intention. These figures could
indeed be at least partially accurate, as the process of removal had to be more carefully planned and
carried out.75 Nevertheless, this figure cannot represent the entirety of affected persons because it
does not account for the thousands of young children who were removed from their families76 and
forcibly adopted by Turkish military officials for Turkification and Islamization. In the document
above, two children were killed in 1938, while two were declared as a closed record, meaning they
are lost persons. Since both of them were young women, this effectively means that they were either
abducted and likely engaged in compulsory sex work, committing suicide to avoid this end,77 or
were killed but were not found. Thus, excluding Ali and Zöhre, ten members of a family of twelve78
were killed or lost in the years 1937 or 1938. If we carefully study these records, we note that there
were five children under the age of sixteen, and five adults between twenty-four and twenty-nine,
so there were only two males that could have potentially been involved in the fighting from that
family: the father and Ali. As we know, the father was a merchant and his son worked with him,
indicating that none of these family members could be considered a “rebel” in any sense of the
word, and so were unlikely to be targeted for removal. Moreover, the father Bertal was actually
a tradesman and collaborating with the state by providing feed for their horses.79 As such, this
document clearly reveals that this family was likely subject to a planned but indiscriminate killing
of whomever the state could access and target effectively. As indicated above, newborn babies and
the unborn population (not knowing how many women were pregnant) have also not been added
to the figures. There are many eyewitness testimonies recalling the killing of pregnant women with
bayonets by the soldiers and their unborn children as well as the killing of young infants.80
According to a careful study of the Dersim/Tunçeli Law (1935), article 34 allows for any person
associated with the “crimes” committed by any other individual either from Dersim who has traveled
to the provinces of Elazığ, Malatya, Sivas, Erzincan, Erzurum, Gümüşhane, Bingöl, or persons
from there who committed such related crimes in Dersim, to be included under the jurisdiction
of the special courts located in Tunceli.81 This provision made it possible for the state to target
specific, particular individuals even those residing outside of Tunceli’s borders. Furthermore, these
cities used to be largely populated by Kurdish Alevis, suggesting that—although the operation
was portrayed as applying chiefly to the area renamed Tunceli—in fact, the jurisdiction of Tunceli
Law and associated operations included nearly the whole Kurdish-Alevi region. This suggest that
figures accounting only for the Tunceli population would not include the population killed in these
additional cities nor the Dersimians killed in other parts of Turkey. For instance, a majority of the
young males taken for military service in that period never returned.82 To date there has been no
research on this matter.
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Apart from the killed or forcibly removed populations, the remaining residents must also
be considered a population deeply and negatively affected by the events of 1938, a matter which
is included in the definition of genocide. Thus, the studies focused only on the final death toll, a
partial acknowledgement of the true impact of a genocide or mass killing. In the case of Dersim,
all the leaders and the nearly half of the population of the community were killed and/or forcibly
displaced from their community. In her memoir, Ane Xatun, the surviving granddaughter of a
former member of parliament Diyap Axa, describes how she suffered from insomnia as she tried to
answer researchers’ questions about the events of 1938.83
There is additional evidence that more killings were planned following the initial operations.
A message from the Ministry of Interior to the Prime Ministry office dated May 18, 1937 indicates
that, “instead of settling our troops in the heartland of Dersim to struggle until they give up, it
was better to undermine their living conditions by destroying villages, herds and crops.”84 As
such, to increase the ultimate number of long-term causalities, they sought to destroy the material
bases of the population’s survival and livelihood such as livestock by burning crops,85 bombing
the natural environment, and looting and burning houses, leaving many survivors to suffer from
hunger, malnutrition, and at risk of infectious disease. Moreover, state operators were also actively
engaged in the deliberate killing of the wounded.86 The lack of medical care and accommodation
during the exceptionally long and harsh winter conditions that characterized mountain life caused
more suffering and indirect causalities87 than are able to be accounted for in the overall death
figures.
There are various testimonies addressing the trauma of genocide88 and its effects on mental
health including suicidal tendencies, crying to the point of blindness and eye damage, complete
silence, as well as psychosomatic consequences that appear in various oral history studies,
deep interviews,89 and more recently published literature on the Dersim genocide and forced
displacement.90 All of this speaks clearly to the heavy trauma inflicted upon Dersimian society.91
Moreover, the problems resulting from widespread sexual violence against women92 and potential
pregnancies, suicides, and the killing of babies93 is not accounted for and there is total silence
from both Dersimians and the Turkish state on the matter. While the state has kept silent to hide
its crimes, larger society also remains silent because of the shame and trauma surrounding sexual
crimes.
Prior to the Nazis, Gas was Used for Mass Killing in Dersim
The first documented use of poisonous gas in Dersim is described by Nuri Dersimi, where “the
region was covered by a thick veil of mist due to the poisonous gas bombs from planes, where no
living creature was left, and the scene was of houses and the forests set on fire, which looked like
a state of hell.”94 Because of his books, in which he gives very important and detailed information
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in relation to Dersim and other Kurdish massacres, Dersimi himself has been targeted in an effort
to discredit him. As such, for nearly seventy years, the role of poisonous gas in mass killings was
not taken into consideration seriously until it was officially referenced by a former Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and then Police Chief, Ihsan Sabri Çağlayangil, in 1986. In an interview, Ihsan
Sabri Çağlayangil stated that “through the entrance of the caves they poisoned them like rats.”
95
In a news report by Tan Gazette dated August 3, 1937, it is indicated that there was a training
course in Elazığ for that same purpose.96 Thus, rumors still circulate that this gas was actually
tested in Dersim97 prior to its use in Nazi Germany.98 Furthermore, in a telegram from the general
inspectorate and commander of the operation in Dersim, Abdullah Alpdoğan, to Ankara a request
for supplies of gas was formally made, as shown below in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Request for gas supplies. Source: Dersim Gazetesi99
In the communication, twenty tons of “Chloracetophenon, Iperit and so on” were ordered,
and the request was signed by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk on August 7, 1937.100 This request makes
it clear that a formal plan was made in 1937 after the initial series of operations in Dersim, and
was implemented in 1938, which resulted in the planned mass killings. Another document from
the Second Directorate Undersecretaries of Air Force to the Prime Ministry office, dated October
20, 1937, indicates that the final parts required for the construction of the latest air force fleet had
arrived from the United States and the necessary annual equipment—worth $200,000 —would be
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purchased by the Turkish Embassy in Washington, DC.101 All these preparations were made in the
same year in which the Prime Minister İnönü had stated that the government already exercised
full control over Dersim, as evident in the headlines of Son Haber on June 15 and Haber on June 18,
1937.102
Denial Process, Methods and Results
The hyperbolic rhetoric of a threatened uprising in an uncontrolled area was used to rally popular
support for the destruction of Kurdish Alevis in Dersim. Until recent years, documents providing
evidence of the use of poisonous gas received little public attention. In addition, many Dersimians
were successfully convinced that neither M. Kemal, nor Ismet Inönü, had been involved in these
events. Diyap Axa, one of the six first Dersim Members of Parliament (MP) in the first parliament
(1920-1923), was invited by Mustafa Kemal to be representative of Dersim. Six years after his
death, his family was massacred in 1938 too. His grandaughter Ane Xatun was the only family
member who survived. Ane Xatun, in her memoir, expresses her strong opinion—common among
Dersimians—that the Chief Commander of General Staff, Fevzi Çakmak, who was particularly
hostile to the Kurds and Alevis, ultimately acted to rescue the surviving population in their final
hour. Without mentioning his name, Ane Xatun recalls her meeting with a minister in which she
expressed her support of a person connected to Fevzi Çakmak’s family for election. This surprised
the minister greatly, leading him to inquire about the underlying reason. In response, she noted
that, “we owe him if a few of us have survived.” He subsequently asked: “Do they really know that
it happened just like this?” When she responded affirmatively, the minister recounts the following
story:
I am a minister now but I was a lieutenant in ‘38 and was responsible for the telexes. It was
not Fevzi Çakmak, it was Iran’s Shah who rescued you…When the army was transferred to
Elaziğ Uluova, they prohibited any press members’ entrance. An Iranian journalist reports
to Iran that he has heard that Alevis have been massacred in Dersim. In that evening at 6
pm there was a note from Iran in which they asked for a stop to the massacre of Alevis. This
note was discussed among the General Staff personnel for a while but later nobody paid any
attention. The second note arrived at 4 am in the morning in which Iran said they were going
to call back all their embassies and stop all relations with Turkey due to the massacre of
Alevis in Dersim.103 In that period Turkey was heavily dependent on Iran’s petrol, gas, even
sugar and tea—all were imported from Iran. Fevzi Çakmak was in the General Staff office in
Ankara that time, and after that second note he flew to Elazığ and stopped the massacre.104

These remarks illustrate that the perpetrators were personalities such as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,
İsmet İnönü, and Fevzi Çakmak105 despite widespread opinion to the contrary. These remarks also
demonstrate the prevalence of narratives denying the nature of the Dersim events as a planned
genocide. More importantly, it suggests that, if not for the intervention by the Shah of Iran, the
state would have continued these indiscriminate massacres. Given Çakmak’s role, as the planner
and commander of the Dersim genocide, his widespread last-minute depiction as the savior is in
contrast to the actual, devastating consequences of his actions. Such portrayals make sense in the
context provided by Ane Xatun’s memoir, although we lack additional supporting sources. Iran’s
connection must also be considered carefully here given their historical connection to Alevis in the
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past, which could have been a resource to attract international attention. The Turkish state must
have been aware of this potential and likely intervened to prevent such actions, at least to some
degree.
“Fighting Feudalism” as Denial of Genocide: The Leftist Movement and State Policy in
Dersim
Although the air bombardments were mostly focused in areas where some tribes resisted the
operations—referred to as the prohibited zone—in the majority of Dersim no resistance to speak of
was present. Death squads went into towns, villages, and hamlets to seek out local leaders—both
religious and otherwise—as well as individuals whose names appeared in official records, such
as in the gendarmery, police, or in court records.106 These individuals were rounded up and killed
in certain locations used as execution centers. Several testimonies provide eyewitness accounts of
this process. These accounts, as well those of survivors, report that machine guns and rifles were
used in the executions. Moreover, many were executed with bayonets to save bullets, indicating
the enormous number of executions. Machine guns were used to ensure there were no accidental
survivals.
While executions continued to take place, the media coverage sought to dehumanize the
victims, invoking the ultra-nationalist Turkish ideological approach which has persisted to this
day.107 The local population/victims were portrayed as bandits and savages who robbed people,
refused to pay their taxes and complete military service, and believed in a “primitive” religion
and who were, in essence, themselves primitive.108 Moreover, they were portrayed as being
manipulated by the axas109 and seyids who resisted the reforms and civilization110 promoted by
the Turkish state for their own benefit. This dehumanization process succeeded in disseminating
perceptions of Dersim as an area of savagery and banditry,111 metaphorically represented as an
open sore, a medical problem to be cured or excised.112 All of these factors support the classification
of the events as a genocide.
All media outlets, including those considered progressive, such as the Tan Gazete,113 expressed
support for the Kemalist policies against Kurds and Dersim in 1937-38. In various news reports,
Tan employed a language of dehumanization to describe Dersim and its inhabitants. For instance,
in a news segment by Latif Erenel, Dersimians were referred to as “the people who are slaves and
stripped of any rights. They spend their life in darkness, benightedness and fear like something
more animal than human.”114 Similarly, a Tan headline dated June 24, 1937, read “The Head
Plunderer, Brigand Seyid Rıza115 Pleaded for Mercy.”116 Cumhuriyet, which was also considered a
progressive daily newspaper, had become one of the most nationalist and thus supportive of ultranationalist ideology in Turkey and of the Dersim genocide. On June 27, 1937, Cumhuriyet’s headline
read: “Tunceli’s scoundrels have been exterminated.”117
After 1938, the phrase “Dersim hadisesi (Dersim incident)” was widely used to deny the
genocidal nature of the events and downplay the atrocities that took place. While the terms genocide
or mass killing simultaneously encompass the ethnic, religious, and political aspect of the killings,
the term incident does not suggest such connection or imply the existence of any perpetrators. On
Fadime Deniz, Dersim 38, personal communication with author, Istanbul (October 2009).
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the contrary, it remains a neutral term and implicitly represents all parties as equals. In the case
of Dersim, this term was particularly useful in concealing the state’s role as the perpetrator of
genocidal acts against Kurdish Alevis. Rather, the dominant narratives sought to represent these
acts as a relatively minor event to manage a small faction of rebels. Thus, the term suggests the
victims, as instigators, were to blame, while suggesting that the state was compelled to act in favor
of societal order, despite the resulting casualties. As such, the contradictions and discrepancies
between the credible sources and Turkish archival sources, and Turkish nationalist narratives118
need to be taken into account, and thus especially in the case of the Dersim genocide and in the
contemporary climate of Turkish academia, where the available sources remain heavily censored.
To buttress the denial process, the term incident always accompanied narratives describing
the “uprising” in Dersim, not just in the language used by the state but also by the Turkish leftist
movement in the only region where progressive politics dominate. Although there was some
resistance to the heavy military operations, there was, in fact, no real uprising.119 Nevertheless,
the rhetoric of an uprising was widely employed by the media. This idea was employed ironically
alongside narratives claiming the tribes of the region were disarmed,120 almost all leaders were
arrested121 and seven of them hanged in 1937, including Seyid Rıza and his son.122 These narratives
also emphasized that the state was in full control of the region, a conviction that is also clearly
apparent in Prime Minister İsmet İnönü’s speech in Parliament in 1937123 and also in Prime Minster,
Celal Bayar’s speech, in 1938,124 and still used effectively for mass killings in 1938.
The uprising discourse was also the prominent discourse invoked by the leftist movement
following the genocidal process from the 1970s until the 1980 coup, though it has become less
prominent today. During the Dersim genocide, the leader of the Turkish Communist Party (TKP),
Ismail Bilen, and a political refugee in the Soviet Union, published Yeni bir Kürt Ayaklanması (A
New Kurdish Uprising), using the pseudonym Rasim Davaz, in which he clearly defends the
military operations in Dersim.
It has been more than two months that the Ankara Government fights against a backward
uprising by the Kurdish tribes in Dersim region. The feudal components, despite the reforms
by the Kemalist Party, succeeded in surviving in this far-off region of the country. This region
was renamed Tunceli last year. Dersim’s dominant classes have succeeded in securing their
privileges despite the laws in force.125

Like all the Alevi regions, Dersim suffered from extreme poverty and possessed little land
suitable for agriculture, being largely comprised of a rough highland where Alevis took refuge to
avoid attacks from the Ottoman and later Turkish state and attempts to forcibly convert Alevis to
(Sunni) Islam. Given the limitations inherent to a region with insufficient arable land, inhabitants
resorted to some plundering in Dersim as well as in the neighboring towns.126 In Halis Paşa’s report
it is clearly indicated that, in these acts, they avoided killing127 and never committed sexual attacks,
prohibited as these were by their religion and culture. The raids were thus restricted mostly to
food-based plundering to secure livestock, wheat, and other subsistence items and were ultimately
driven by the poverty resulting from the Turkish-Islamic pressure on the region.
Despite conditions of acute poverty and starvation, there were no capitalist-style classes, and
thus communists were ideally situated to defending a better life for the suppressed population.
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Despite this fact, Ismail Bilen, chair of the TKP, justified the mass killings that involved tens of
thousands of people in one defenseless region as necessary for the sake of Turkish modernism.
The Turkish leftist movement’s Kemalist/nationalist character becomes apparent in this
particular example and has been criticized by a relatively small number of leftist intellectuals and
organizations. Ismail Beşikçi, a Turkish academic who served seventeen years in prison due to his
research on Kurdish issues in Turkey, has criticized the leftist movement “as the partner of Turkish
State’s colonialist massacres over the Kurdistan,” remarking that:
They [leftists] are against the Kurdish nation who have struggled against conquests, and
colonialism, those who have struggled for the right to self-determination. The Kurdish
national movement was discredited in every sentence of their reports. Accordingly, they
designed reports in which they praised it’s [Kemalist secular nationalism] acts and evaluated
them as ‘progressive’ and ‘revolutionary.’128

Both the Kemalist state and various leftist groups suppressed Kurdish political organizations
operating in Dersim. In that period, the only Turkish leftist group supportive of the thesis of
Kurdistan’s status as a colony129 and critical of the leftist movement for its Kemalist characteristics
was the Kurtuluş130 movement.131 As such, it gained support and Dersim become its stronghold for a
short period of time between the 1970s and 1980s. Interestingly, this group was targeted and nearly
all its cadres were assassinated between 1976-1980, including the first and the only assassinated
woman, an engineering student from Dersim (Aynur Sertkaya), and the first high school student
executed by hanging (Necdet Adalı).132 Some of the deaths were suspicious “accidents.” Most
of the perpetrators were never found and so the deaths remain labeled as unknown killings, like
hundreds of other political killings inculpating the deep state. Gradually, Kurtuluş’s members were
eradicated from the city, alongside other Kurdish political organizations such as Kawa and Tekoşin.133
Another Kurdish leftist organization, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), was blamed for being
ilkel milliyetçi (primitive nationalist) and thus heavily attacked by some of these leftist organizations
as well as the state. While the organizations sensitive to the Kurdish and Alevi identity have left
Dersim, even those who had engaged in Kurdish politics on a legal basis were hunted by the state.
Other groups resistant to these identities have for the most part been left to freely engage in their
activities. It should be further noted that the most effective persons among the leftist organizations
in favor of Kurdish identity or themselves in Kurdish national were all brutally killed by the state,
such as Huseyin Cevahir (in Istanbul 1971), Ibrahim Kaypakkaya (in Diyarbakır 1973), and also an
Armenian, Orhan Bakır (Armenak Bakırciyan, in Karakoçan/Elaziğ1980).
In Dersim, the great majority of the political ideology was shared between the most leftist
organizations’ policies and the state’s official TIS ideology. The Kemalist tone within the leftist
movement provides additional evidence of the state’s homogenization policies and its efforts to
influence and manipulate the leftist movement as well as its associated discourses. As Beşikci points
out, “the success of the Kemalists’ is to make itself be defended by the socialists,”134 while Ahmet
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Kahraman, a Kurdish intellectual, argues that the Kemalist cadres of the Turkish state founded the
Turkish Communist Party (TKP) to obtain financial aid from the Soviet Union. After succeeding,
they killed the communists on their way back to the Black Sea.135
The state and leftist organizations used rhetoric to mobilize Dersimian youth against their own
society that resembled the discourses used during the Dersim military attacks, such as mobilizing
around the fight against feudalism. In this fight against feudalism, the state attacked derebeyis,136
meaning the aşîret leaders and seyids, before and during the period between 1937 and 1938. The
various leftist organizations in the 1970s attacked the very same institutions, the aşîrets (axa) and
Ocax/seyidship, and similarly defined their struggle as one against the patron-ağa state. Axaship
of the tribe system was crucial for Kurdish ethnic survival, while the Ocax system (seyids) was
important for the survival of Alevism. Thus, both together were central to the functioning of the
governing body of Kurdish Alevi society in Dersim. While the axaship in Dersim does give the axa
some authority in the representation of the tribe, they do not own the land of the tribe, though they
do maintain ownership of some personal land. Designated tribal land cannot be sold to anyone
outside of the tribe. As such, this system of land ownership does not entail the kind of feudal
lordship 137 that both the Turkish state in the 1930s and leftist organizations in the 70s used in their
rhetoric to delegitimize and support attacks on social organization in Dersim.138
In addition to attacking the axaship, the seyids, members of a sacred genealogy within the
tribes who solved internal disputes, were also portrayed as backward institutions that were
inherently opposed to a modern Turkish state. In line with this argument, both leftists and the
state were simultaneously pointing out the inferiority of Kurds, who they claimed could not
progress and were thus exploited by the axas and seyids, the representatives of “primitive/heretic”
religion. This discourse was further invoked by the state to portray the 1938 genocide as an effort
to bring civilization to Dersim. Interestingly, this was also the Ottoman’s motto: to fight against
backwardness and bring civilization to Dersim, as is underlined in the words of Kazim Ateş who
pointed out “the continuation between the Abdülhamid period’s modernizing concept (in general,
19th Century Ottoman modernism concept) and Kemalist modernism.”139
The socialist project was also a project of modernism by the leftist movement and justified
itself as necessary to bring socialism and rescue Dersimian from patron-axas’ exploitations.140 The
situation in Dersim was, in fact, better characterized as one of land scarcity, in which no such
feudal land ownership system existed to exploit others. In other Sunni regions, where feudal
land ownership and exploitation was, in fact, severe, such as in Çukurova, Urfa, Antep, there was
no such fight against feudalism by the state, nor did leftist organizations engage in comparable
activities. This suggests that these activities were not principally an effort to bring socialism to a
region suffering under feudalism, otherwise leftist organizations and the state would have targeted
these other regions as well and, perhaps, more aggressively, rather than focusing solely on Dersim
and other Kurdish Alevis sites.
In the Dersim case, by contrast, the majority of internationalist leftist movements and the
nationalist Turkish state surprisingly shared the same ideas and the same strategy, outlining the
seyids and axas as exploiters, and the ones to be fought against. A Turkish sub-lieutenant, Hüseyin
Özalp, in memoirs recounting his military service in Dersim, expressed that “the institution of
dedeship141 which Alevism depended on, was collapsing…[t]he effect of Partizan’s142 propaganda
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of the years cannot be denied on that matter.”143 As it is clear, while the leftist aspired towards a
socialist revolution, in which neither ethnic nor religious difference existed,144 the Turkish state
promised to bring civilization exclusively to Dersim, where no feudal exploiters such as the—axas
and seyids—would no longer exist. While the leftists promised a socialist country with no ethnic
or religious differentiation—in effect rendering Turkishness hegemonic—the state was promising
equality after civilization and a process of homogenization that would eventually assimilate the
entirety of the population as Muslim Turks.
As argued above, while many leftists and the communist party were supportive of the genocide,
later on, many leftist organizations played a significant role in denying the genocide by preventing
any connection with ethnicity and religion and glorifying the genocide as an “uprising against
the system.” As such, Kurdish Alevi youth were successfully led by these organizations to target
their own societal structures instead of the nationalist State. Represented as an uprising against
the system, without any mention whatsoever of the number of people massacred, the Kemalist/
nationalist cadres were successfully cleared of culpability. Subsequently, leader cadres of the CHP145
such as Mustafa Kemal (the president, the planner), İsmet İnönü (the Prime Minister) and Fevzi
Çakmak (the Chief of General Staff) were not only cleared of their responsibilities in the genocide,
but also (and more importantly) were rendered heroes, even saviors of the surviving population.146
CHP was subsequently labelled a progressive party in Turkey and Dersim itself. Mustafa Kemal’s
portrait hung in Dersimian homes and to this day remain in all Alevi institutions and cemevis.147
Streets, schools, hospitals, bridges and neighborhoods were named after the perpetrators: Atatürk,
İnönü, and Çakmak. Until the 2000s, when the Kurdish movement was strengthened and allowed
to participate in the elections, nearly all of the MPs and mayors of Dersim were elected from the
CHP. As such, all of the MPs and mayors further served to absolve and exculpate the perpetrators
of their roles in the crimes committed against the people of the city. Genocide thus remains the
worst kept secret, while the CHP continues to be labelled a progressive party that many leftists,
Alevis, Alevi organizations, and NGOs in Turkey and Dersim have affiliated themselves with. No
mention is made of the crimes CHP leaders committed in Dersim or of their involvement in other
crimes against non-Turkish and non-Muslim communities. By suppressing their Kurdish and Alevi
identity, the Alevi Kurds were able to become members of the party. Thus, many Alevi and Dersim
NGOs remain heavily controlled by CHP, which effectively means the support of the TIS ideology.
Conclusion
The evidence discussed here suggests that the 1937-38 military operations in Dersim clearly meet
the criteria to be classified as a genocide according to the 2nd Article of the Genocide Convention.
This evidence includes: the long durée (duration) of the preparations and planning that began in
the 1930s, the significant military action as represented in the number of soldiers involved and the
military equipment employed,148 the two-year duration of these events, and, finally the ultimate
military directive “to hit anything live.”149 In addition, the assertion of genocide is further supported
by estimates that place the number of casualties in the tens of thousands, the number of Dersimian
residents subject to forced displacement to the Western cities of Turkey, the thousands of female
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children taken from their families and raised by army personnel150 to encourage their assimilation,
the damage to the city of Dersim and the calculated destruction of her social structures to prevent
the survival of the remaining population, the lack of any adequate medical and/or psychological
support for orphaned children, the wounded, and all others affected by these devastating events.
It is also clear from both official reports and other documents based on academic writings,
news, witnesses’ statements, memoirs, and exile literature that the military operations in Dersim
between 1937-38 were primarily launched to enact policies of Turkification and Islamization. The
UN definition stresses the intention of the crime above its quantitative impact upon the population
or its duration. The main aim of these operations is apparent in the legal process that preceded
the genocide, such as the Law of Maintaining Order (1925), Resettlement Law (1934), Dersim/
Tunçeli Law (1935), and the related official documents, interviews, official statements made by
high-ranking officials.
Due to state-sponsored policies of homogenization, it is clear that at least between forty-six and
sixty-three thousand people, including the remaining Armenian population, were killed and more
than thirteen thousand Dersimians were forcibly evacuated and resettled in the Western cities of
Turkey for the purpose of assimilation. In attempts to justify or deny the large number of casualties
and population displacement, media outlets have systematically produced dehumanizing
portrayals of residents of the region as bandits and savages participating in an uprising against
civilization and state reforms.
The degree of overlapping policies and discourses through which Kurdish ethnicity and Alevi
religion were targeted and denied, reveals that the Turkish state exerted significant control over
the policies of the leftist movement in Turkey and, particularly in Dersim. Both sides relied upon
almost the same discourse, attacked the same structures, and justified their actions as a fight against
feudalism only in the Kurdish Alevi regions, where, in fact, no western-type feudalism exists.
Using this same argument, a rhetoric of uprising served as the basis for the denial of the mass
killings of unarmed civilians. The state as well as various leftist organizations were hostile to
Kurdish leftist organizations that focused on Kurdish identity, forcing them out of Dersim, while
others were permitted to remain and co-opted into the state’s efforts to suppress Kurdish identity
demands and deny the genocide.
Thus, while expunging organizations and persons in favor of Kurdish identity from the
region, other organizations, and their discourses were permitted to survive in order to suppress the
Kurdish identity. As such, until 1980, the rallying cry in Dersim remained: “[w]e are socialist who
are internationalist and atheist [not Kurdish or Alevi],” while, between 1990 and 2000, this slogan
became “[w]e are Alevis, and Alevis are not Kurdish,” and then between 2000 and 2020, the slogan
widely echoed throughout Dersim has been “[w]e are Zaza and Zazas are not Kurdish.” Efforts to
clear Dersim of Kurdish and Alevi identity through the genocide in 1937-38 have been successfully
enacted with devastating consequences but not yet completed. Such efforts continue in the form of
ethnocide, culturicide, and ecocide, alongside a denial of the 1937-38 genocide.
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